On July 17, 2018, the UK-based Nuffield Council on Bioethics released its long-awaited report on the social and ethical issues raised by heritable genome editing.¹ The significance of the report has only been heightened by unconfirmed news from China of the birth of twins whose genomes are said to have been edited before implantation.² Heritable genome editing denotes the modification of the DNA of an embryo, sperm, or egg to alter the characteristics of future generations.¹ Unlike earlier reports, this report rejects drawing a distinction between therapeutic heritable genome editing (eg, corrects disease-causing genes) and heritable genome editing intended for cognitive or physical enhancement (eg, augments stature or other attributes).^1,3 According to the report, either approach 鈥渃ould be ethically acceptable鈥� as long as such interventions are (1) 鈥渋ntended to secure, and are consistent with, the welfare of a person who may be born as a consequence鈥� and (2) 鈥渦phold principles of social justice and solidarity鈥� and 鈥渟hould not produce or exacerbate social division, or marginalise or disadvantage groups in society.鈥�¹ The main underlying principle of the report was that 鈥渢he desire of people鈥�to secure鈥�the welfare of their children by using genome editing to influence their inherited characteristics gave rise to a morally powerful claim.鈥�¹ In this Viewpoint, we examine the report and explore the Nuffield Council on Bioethics鈥� rejection of the notion that genes alone account for who humans are (ie, genomic essentialism) as key to the formulation of their recommendations.